UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

THE BOARDMAN LECTURESHIP
IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

A MODERN STUDY OF CONSCIENCE

REV. OLIVER HUCKEL, S.T.B.

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

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THE BOARDMAN LECTURESHIP IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

A MODERN STUDY OF CONSCIENCE

BY

The Rev. OLIVER HUCKEL, S.T.B. (Boston),
Sometime Graduate Student at Berlin and Oxford.
Pastor of the Associate Congregational Church,
Baltimore.

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by

Oliver Huckel

HISTORY OF THE FOUNDATION.

ON June 6, 1899, the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania accepted from the Rev. George Dana Boardman, D.D., LL.D., and wife, a Deed of Gift, providing for a foundation to be known as "The Boardman Lectureship in Christian Ethics," the income of the fund to be expended solely for the purposes of the Trust. After provision for refunding out of the said income, any depreciation which might occur in the capital sum, the remainder is to be expended in procuring the delivery in each year at the University of Pennsylvania, of one or more lectures on Christian Ethics from the standpoint of the life, example and teachings of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the publication, in book form, of the said lecture or lectures within four months of the completion of their delivery. The volume in which they are printed shall always have in its forefront a printed statement of the history and terms of the Foundation.

On July 6, 1899, a Standing Committee on "The Boardman Lectureship in Christian Ethics" was constituted, to which shall be committed the nominations of the lecturers and the publications of the lectures in accordance with the Trust.

On February 6, 1900, on recommendation of this committee, the Rev. George Dana Boardman, D.D., LL.D., was appointed Lecturer on Christian Ethics on the Boardman Foundation. for the current year. And on November 18, 1900, Dr. Boardman delivered the inaugural lecture on "The Golden Rule."

On December 12, 1905, on recommendation of the Boardman Lectureship Committee, the Rev. Oliver Huckel, S. T. B. (Boston), graduate of this University, Class of '87, and also graduate student of Berlin and Oxford, was appointed Lecturer on Christian Ethics on the Boardman Foundation. And on March 20, 1906, Dr. Huckel delivered a lecture on "A Modern Study of Conscience."

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A MODERN STUDY OF CONSCIENCE.

A MODERN STUDY OF CONSCIENCE.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: The invitation of the Trustees of this University to lecture on the George Dana Boardman Foundation in Christian Ethics came to me not only as an honor and privilege which I deeply appreciate, but also as a sort of inner challenge to my own soul to bring to expression some new thoughts in ethical lines that had long been maturing. Historic events are often followed by a fuller study of their causes and significance. In this city of Philadelphia, which has witnessed in recent days such a notable reawakening of conscience, it may not be inappropriate or untimely to study in a modern way what it is that has thus been reawakened to quickened power and renewed authority. It was also a gratification for me to learn after the subject of this lecture had been announced that the theme chosen was one in which the distinguished founder of this Lectureship was deeply interested and for which he had partly planned an exposition. It is exceedingly pleasant to feel that in some measure therefore this present discussion in Christian ethics, which I have called "A Modern Study of Conscience," will follow along his own hoped-for lines.

THERE is a fine phrase of Coleridge that "the conscience bears the same relation to God as an accurate timepiece bears to the sun,"[1] Richard Hooker, in his famous Ec-

clesiastical Polity calls it "the voice of the original reason which is laid up in the bosom of God." Sophocles spoke of it, in the Antigone, as something whose utterances "are not of to-day, nor of yesterday, and no man can tell whence they came." Noble old Dr. Martineau somewhere says: "I feel that in the life of conscience there is a real communion between the human and the divine spirit."

Most suggestive and, in a deep sense, true are these characterizations, but a modern study needs some closer definition. Many ethical thinkers of to-day define conscience as the entire moral constitution or nature of man. Some hold that this moral nature is a separate faculty in man. Thus Dr. Thomas Reid defines it as "an original power of the mind, a moral faculty, by which we have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, and the dictates of which form the first principles of morals." Others hold that conscience apprehends the distinctions of right and wrong, but only applies them personally. Thus President Mark Hopkins says: "We may define conscience to be the whole moral con-

sciousness of a man in view of his own actions as related to moral law."[2] Others hold that "conscience should not be used as an appellation for a separate or special moral faculty, for the reason that there is no such faculty." This was President Noah Porter's view. "The same intellect," he contends, "so far as it knows itself, acts with respect to moral relations under the same laws, and by the same methods of comparison, deduction, and inference, as when it is concerned with other material." Some, like the German Rothe, in his last revision of his ethics, refuse to define conscience at all, and are inclined to say that the word is scientifically inadmissible because its contents have been so variously accounted.

In spite of these differences of definition, it is manifest, as Bishop Butler asserts, that "a great part of common language and of common behavior over the world is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty, whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a perception of

the understanding, or a sentiment of the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both."[3]

We will therefore conclude to hold in this discussion to something of this general assumption—that there is a moral sense, a divine reason, in the soul of man, and that it can be scientifically studied and defined. The difficulty of definition, however, is a real one. Popular usage adds still greater confusion. The ordinary meanings of the word conscience are so diverse and ambiguous. At various times it may mean either source of moral obligation, or standard of moral judgment, or discerner of moral law, or enforcer of moral law. In ethics, however, we may recognize two definitions as uppermost. Conscience is, first of all, those subjective functions of the mind which go under the designation of the moral sense, but also, secondly, the objective results of the moral judgments,—or the sum of the acknowledged rules of duty, that is, the moral code or standard for an individual or a community. This is often spoken of as a man's conscience, or the public conscience—an objective and collective

conception to which the individual or community ought to measure up.[4]

But in our thought of conscience in this present discussion we shall continue to hold as far as possible to the first and essential definition of conscience, that is, the moral reason or full consciousness of a man in the deepest and most vital relations of life. For we not only surely recognize individual conscience as the judge of life, the source of duty, and the inspiration of the noblest human living and service, but also we recognize a church conscience which we call the consensus which is the spirit of the church under the tuition of that Spirit which shall lead us into all truth; and a civic conscience, which is the city or state feeling out after nobler and higher things; and a social conscience which is a consciousness of God's love in human society; and a national conscience which is the consciousness of God in the leadership of the nation in that righteousness which alone exalteth it; and we are beginning to discern, as Maurice Maeterlinck and others do, a conscience or consciousness of God in all humanity, in the whole race, in the

higher instincts and aspirations that the race is developing; and also what Dr. Richard M. Bucke calls "a cosmic consciousness" which enters into sympathy with the life of God in all His universe and in a sense becomes in tune with the Infinite.

It will be our purpose to-day to look into the origin and nature of conscience, then to look at its means of education and enlightenment, and finally to consider the grounds for the present and perpetual authority of conscience. It is a large task that we have undertaken for one lecture—to attempt to dissolve some of the current ambiguities and to endeavor to get a clear conception of the meaning of conscience. We must be content to condense much, and to lay the emphasis on a few chief thoughts.

I.

THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE.

SHALL we consider, first of all, what may be the origin and nature of conscience? It is an intricate discussion, with a long history. But we can make it, I think, reasonably brief, and yet indicate the significant features.

Many of the ancients seemed to think conscience a special instinct, faculty or being within the soul. The dæmon of Socrates to which both Plato and Xenophon bear witness seemed a "divine sign," or as Plato called it "a warning voice" to which Socrates was always obedient.[5] But in these modern days the theory of conscience as a special faculty in the soul has almost entirely gone by.

It might be exceedingly interesting, if we had the time, to sketch something of the ancient and medieval studies of conscience. Greek philosophy in the ethics of Plato and Aristotle was largely

concerned with the highest good, the *summum bonum*. It was emphatically objective. The later philosophy became intensely subjective, as in the systems of the Roman Empire, when the problem of the source of moral obligation became uppermost. The Stoics found the rule in reason; the Epicureans in sense.[6]

The early Christian ages, and medieval scholasticism gave little light to the problems. The Renaissance began a new era. The Reformation was a liberating movement, and discussion of conscience was again taken up. Descartes and Spinoza express in the domain of pure thought the new philosophic spirit. British moralists were strong in the movement. Among the first great thinkers in ethical doctrine was Hobbes. With him "the moral faculty or conscience is nothing but reason, calculating how best to secure individual advantage, and deciding upon submission to the State as the best means of securing the end aimed at." This rather low theory of conscience provoked many answers in the subsequent ethical thought of England. Cudworth, for instance, in his treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable

Morality, contended that man is not a creature of selfish instincts with morality based on conventions, but that he has the power of recognizing by reason the essential distinctions of good and evil, and his morality is based on eternal fact. Shaftesbury, a little later, contended that man possessed social as well as selfish instincts. Virtue is the balance of the two. The perfection or power of balance is due to a moral sense. These views are some advance over the psychological and ethical principles of Hobbes. Bishop Butler came and labored to establish the supremacy of this moral sense, and to make it the arbiter and authority in morals. But Bishop Butler, however valuable and tonic his work, was "a victim of the current psychology" of his day, and his doctrine of conscience is not at all final, and cannot be a basis for ethics. Paley, Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Hume, Bain, with their varied differences, all followed this same sensationalist psychology of the eighteenth century. Immanuel Kant, with a reply to Hume's skepticism, introduced a new conception of man and the spiritual world, placing the emphasis on

what he called "the categorical imperative," the inherent demand of the soul. Dr. Martineau contended with fuller emphasis along the lines of Bishop Butler in the previous century. He defined conscience to be "the critical perception we have of the relative authority of our several principles of action." He defined right and wrong thus: "Every action is right which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher; every action is wrong which in presence of a higher principles, follows a lower." In both Butler and Martineau, however, conscience is unexplained and inexplicable. It is a unique, separate and mysterious faculty with no organic relation to self-consciousness and with a blind authority. It is a God-given and infallible dictator in moral things; a splendid tyrant sitting within the soul, as sovereign in the life.

It is at this point that a modern study of conscience may be said to take up the problem and to bring it into new light. This may be considered the modern view, as now generally held: Conscience has two elements—moral judgment and moral obligation. As to judgment, it is prob-

able that reason acts in conscience as it acts in any other matter. And therefore the judgments of conscience are fallible; but as to obligation, there is something unique. We recognize that an ordinary judgment of reason may or may not involve obligation, but a moral judgment does involve obligation. There is a sense of the ought which is manifest and unmistakable.

Now this fact of the sense of moral obligation, the sense of the ought, is a manifest reality and must be accounted for. The question is, whether this norm, this sense of obligation is native or acquired? The intuitionalists would say that it is native; the evolutionists, that it is acquired. The truest view would probably be a reconciliation of these views, for in a certain way this sense of obligation is both native and acquired.

Many of the intuitionalists would not, however, agree to reconciliation, for they would not accept the cosmic theory of the evolutionists, although it may give a very full and noble view of life. The intuitionalists would hold that the successive epochs of life, consciousness, morality in man

were implanted *ab extra* at certain stages of life, or in the individual man. The evolutionist, however, has place in different epochs for the evolving of new things—such as life and, again, consciousness and again morality—which have not appeared before. They are new things in the fulness of time, and yet were all in the original plan. The evolutionist holds that the whole universe is not a creation with a series of gaps to be filled up (as Dr. Martineau so vigorously contended in his "Theories of Ethical Development")—successive patchings by the original artificer. His whole plan is formed in the beginning, and new features appear from time to time which were not visible or in use before, but they were all in the original plan. So that, for instance, when man reaches a sufficient ripeness in development the sense of oughtness appears. This sense is not thrust in *ab extra;* it appeared when the fulness of time came. Its after development, however, was effected by processes of education and enlightenment.

It is true at the same time that evolutionists as well as intuitionalists would recognize equally

the authority of this moral obligation in the individual man. Such thorough-going evolutionists as Herbert Spencer and Leslie Stephens readily concede this. The only dispute now is the unessential and speculative one—where is the historic or prehistoric origin of this unique sense of obligation? Is it involved in the original plan, or is it something superadded to the original plan? This is the situation: All axiomatic principle, whether in mathematics or morality, go back to prehistoric origins, and become speculative problems.

This is, in brief, the usual modern view now generally received. But there is a further modern view—not as yet generally received—to which I would call your attention, and, indeed, upon which I would lay emphasis as leading into most suggestive and vital fields of ethical and spiritual thought. Some may call it speculative. I would call it prophetic. Some of you may refuse to go with it. Yet it has dignified authority for its introduction, and a very respectable following, not only among ethical thinkers, but in the latest facts of biology and psychology. With a broader

and deeper conception of mind, of knowledge and of the universe, with a new psychology and a new world-theory, if we may so call it, has been made possible a new conception of conscience, and a deeper and broader and more vital one, even than the preceding. The new view comes to some minds almost like the discovery of a new world.

It was first suggested by Prof. Thomas Hill Green, Fellow of Balliol and Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford, in his "Prolegomena to Ethics." This is the substance of it: "Man is a self or personality, which is not merely an incident in a series, but is rooted in an infinite self or personality. . . . Our individual self-consciousness derives from and is maintained by an infinite, eternal, universal self-consciousness. . . . Knowledge is the gradual discovery of mind or spirit in things, that is, the discovery in the world of the self-manifestation of the infinite personality with whom the finite intelligence of man is one. Morality is the progressive accomplishment of an eternal purpose, with which the individual is and ought to

be at one, whose goal is the perfection of man. The good for man is self-realization, but it is the realization of an infinite self, and is thus identical with the widest possible range of good for others, and is attained by the profoundest self-surrender. The moral faculty in man, the practical reason or conscience, is no special inexplicable endowment, no *vox clamantis in deserto*—it is the man himself, conscious in all action of a good which he either reaches or fails to reach. If he reaches the good, it approves and beckons him onward and upward; if he fails to reach the good, it condemns him and binds on him the penalty due to one who has broken the law of his own being. Conscience, thus conceived, may also with equal truth be described as the revelation of infinite good to man, or the voice of God witnessing to eternal right within the individual soul. It is the voice of the man's true self, and his true self is ideally one with God."[7] Here is a clearer ground for absolute right and a more satisfactory basis for the Christian ethic of conscience.[8]

See how some of the modern biologic and psychologic studies of man seem to confirm this

view. In these modern days we try to study the origin of conscience along natural lines. Looking at it in this way, conscience seems to be an inheritance of the race, gradually developed by the growing intelligence of humanity. In its main features, it is a collective possession, although it may widely differ in details then and now in America, India and darkest Africa. It is a development of the instinct growing through the generations that the right is simply that which is for the good of all. Conscience seems to be here the attempt to follow the right for the good of all. The old utilitarians have now largely gone over to the evolutionists.

In the most primitive conditions, conscience was doubtless even more primitive than that. It was the instinct to follow the right because that was simply what would preserve life. It was, therefore, one development of the instinct of self-preservation. And in its ultimate reaches, it is also essentially that. The dictates of conscience on the whole are in the way that preserves life. The right in the long run is simply the path of the fullest and longest life. People, nations,

which despise conscience inevitably go to destruction. It has, therefore, in part at least, adopted the new category of self-realization as the *summum bonum* and ultimate end of life. Professor Zöllner confirms this in these words: "The painful feelings of shame or a bad conscience serve the practical ends of nature. They are the preventives, as it were, which hinder us from doing what is injurious to ourselves, just as animals can distinguish between wholesome and unwholesome food by means of their more finely developed nerves of taste. Wherever an individual or a nation is deprived of the instinctive feeling of shame (or conscience) dissolution follows." (Quoted by Paulsen, p. 365).[9] All chronicles of mankind prove it.

This in very briefest way, is something of the natural history of conscience—the biologic and psychologic history. But in the final analysis, in its philosophic and theologic history we see that even this natural history has its divine origins. Conscience is not merely the hereditary wisdom of a people, or of humanity, but back of that is something deeper. We do not disassociate God

from His universe. All development is the unfolding of His thought and life. Conscience is no exception. It finds its roots in the divine. Its growing clearness and strength is a revelation of God's presence.

We see, therefore, something of the meaning of the further differing definitions of conscience that are often given. Conscience, says a naturalist, is a highly important organ for preserving life. "A man's conscience," says Clifford, "is the voice of his tribal self. The individual self being subordinate to the tribal self." Conscience, says another, is that phase of our nature which opposes inclination and manifests itself in the feeling of obligation and duty. "A man's conscience," says still another, Professor Starke, "is a particular kind of pleasure and pain felt in perceiving our own conformity or non-conformity to principles."

"Conscience," says Prof. Frederick Paulsen, "is a knowledge of a higher will by which the individual feels himself internally bound." Conscience, still another says, is the voice of God. "Conscience," says Fichte, "is the rational and universal principle of guidance. It is that which

bids us advance along the line of rational development." Trendelenburg asserts that conscience is the reaction and pro-action of the total God-centered man against the man as partial, especially against the self-seeking part of himself.[10] Schlegel's definition is interesting: "Conscience is an inward revelation as a warning voice, which, though sounding in us, is not of us, and makes itself to be felt as an awe and fear of Deity. It is in all human bosoms and lies at the source of all morality. It first originates imperatives in consciousness, and involves all that is moral or religious in the human race."[11] There is the recognition in all these definitions of something natural, inherent, universal and fundamental in conscience. It belongs in the order of the deepest law of life.

Conscience and consciousness are very close words, derived from the same roots and both meaning "the knowing." Conscience and conscious were words in the old days to be used for one another. For instance Shakespeare speaks of some fair queen "conscience of her worth." The specialized uses of the words in

these modern days may, however, signify for us this: Conscious indicates ordinary consciousness; conscience a consciousness of higher things.

Let us look at it in this way. Man is not an independent being in this world. He is only a part of a greater being. In God it is that he lives and moves and has his being. Knowledge is not a creation of new things. It is only finding out what already exists. It is only the discovery of God in life and nature and all things. It is the finding of more and more of that infinite knowledge and truth which is God. Affection is not the new creation of sentiment in our lives. It is only a coming into more of God's nature. The more we love, and the more purely we love, the nearer we are to God. Loving is only rising into the life of God, for God is love. Faith is not a separate faculty or function, nor even a sixth sense, as some have called it. Faith is just the opening of the heart to God. It is the inner eye opened to see God. It is the discovery of God. Conscience, in the same way, may be conceived not merely as a separate faculty of mind, but as the whole man rising into a consciousness

of God in his life. Conscience is, as Professor Green says, no lonely voice calling in the wilderness of man's life; conscience is no special inexplicable endowment; it is the man himself, the whole man, as he feels himself in the presence of a higher power which we call God.

Do we not see in man the unfoldment of his life in three great steps of upward progress? First, instinct, the sense-consciousness which makes known to us the world about us; which guides us in all the ordinary operations of our physical life. We share this same instinct with the birds of the air and the beasts of the field. Second, reason, the self-consciousness which makes known to us the world within us; which tells us of ourselves and of the marvelous processes of thought and imagination. This gift of reason upraises man above the beasts of the field. And, third, conscience, the God-consciousness which makes known to us the world that is above us and beyond us, the invisible and eternal world. This last is the supreme privilege of our lives,—the privilege that links us with the angels of God and the creatures of the heavenly realm. This

supreme unfoldment of our lives lifts us into communion with God.

Conscience, therefore, in its highest reaches, is not merely a "faculty of mind." It is that, but more than that. It is a man's consciousness of God. You recognize that the divine law of a man's own being is self-realization. He is to make the best and the most of himself. The more nearly he approaches to that ideal the more nearly he approaches God. A man's true self is thus ideally at least one with God, as Christ revealed to us—ideally one, that is, one in spirit, purpose, will.

Does this larger conception of conscience dignify it too much? Is it easier for some of us to hold the smaller conception of conscience as a mere faculty of the mind, the moral instinct, the spiritual reason? Is it easier to deal with a faculty than with God? Is it easier to educate a faculty than to open the life to God? It may be easier to deal with conscience in its more primitive aspects. It may be easier to assume it as a faculty of the mind and nothing else. But it is the truth we are after in this matter. It is

the naked truth, strong, living, majestic. Conscience, it is true, begins as a mere faculty of the mind, but even then it is the faculty of wonderful vision. For only God places that instinct in our souls. And when conscience rises into its strength and fulness, then it is a man living in his consciousness of the infinite God within him and around him.

I am not sure that Professor Green is right—we may treat this subject with a very comfortable lack of dogmatism—but his view is worth our hospitable consideration as the most suggestive and fruitful of modern expositions. I have the feeling also that it will be along something of these lines that the larger studies of conscience may yet proceed. For it leads into touch with vital and eternal and cosmic issues. We may, therefore, do well to hold it in mind, and think it through carefully. It seems worthy of our attention. Professor Green announced these views, as we said, in his "Prolegomena to Ethics," the last work before his death, in 1882, and left unfinished. He was a radical-wing Hegelian, with philosophic antecedents also in Spi-

noza. He may not be an altogether safe guide, scarcely more so in philosophy and ethics than Prof. Ernst Haeckel in science, and yet he is most interesting—even fascinating—and most suggestive. Perhaps the fascination of his spell may wear off, as it did with Prof. John Dewey, who was formerly an ardent disciple of Green. I do not know. His theories at times come very close to a philosophic pantheism,—in his case personally to a Christian pantheism, if we may use the contradictory term. His views are at times mystical, perhaps vague and extravagant. They need limitation to keep them sane. But these limitations are possible. Take that second chapter in the first book of the "Prolegomena," on the relation of man, as intelligence, to the spiritual principle in nature. Professor Green says: "Man becomes the vehicle of the eternally complete consciousness." It is easily possible to preserve personality by saying man reflects or becomes conscious of the eternal complete consciousness. Surely, in spiritualized ethics, his views may come very close to Christian experience.[13]

Perhaps this view, after all, is also not so new as we may imagine. It may be only a change of emphasis. It may be only a difference in nomenclature and terminology. For some germs of this latest view, some intimations now and then may be found in many of the older ethical teachers. I am not sure but Plato, if we could fully know him, would be a disciple of the latest conception of conscience. I find frequent glimpses in all the centuries of what has now come out into the fuller light and stronger appeal. Something of the same view seems to have been held by Dr. Adolf Wuttke, of Halle, for instance. He calls conscience "the revelation of the divine will to the moral subject, as given in the rational consciousness. . . . It never exists without a God-consciousness—it is, in fact, one of the phases of this consciousness. . . . Conscience is the germ proper of man's God-likeness. . . . It is the finest part of the essence of rationality. . . . What axioms are in mathematics, that is conscience in the moral sphere. Conscience is the inner essence of the divine image coming to self-consciousness."[12] These words are worthy

of fullest consideration.[13] Our most modern psychologists now use the significant expression the "field of consciousness" for experiences not hitherto connoted. Prof. William James gives some attention to this in his "Varieties of Religious Experiences." This word of his is suggestive: "Until quite lately the unit of mental life which figured most was the single 'idea,' supposed to be a definitely outlined thing. But at present psychologists are tending, first, to admit that the actual unit is more probably the total mental state, the entire wave of consciousness present to the thought at any time; and, second, to see that it is impossible to outline this wave, this field, with any definiteness."[14]

May we not venture, therefore, to hold, at least tentatively, that conscience is more than the voice of God in the soul—more than a categorical imperative of Kant which may be something apart from God. More than a voice—it is the divine presence. Of course we believe that conscience is the clarification of the reason—the reason of the whole man, the highest reason, acting on moral matters. But go back of the highest

reason, may not the progressive clarification of the highest reason be the progressive entering into the consciousness of God? This is what we mean: We are embedded in God, our life and all that is noblest in it is derived from God. In the terms of pure intellect and of rational thought we end when we say that conscience is the highest reason, or the clarification of reason. But in the ethics of Jesus we go beyond. We see the reason as that most akin to God and the progressive clarification of the reason, as a fuller and fuller entering into the reason and the life of God. Perhaps you will say that this is mysticism rather than rationalism. Perhaps clear-cut reason here ends in religious experience. But remember, this is not a mere philosophic discussion. It is a study in Christian ethics, distinctly and positively based on Christian faith and experience. And in all this we are getting into the meaning of vital ethics, not merely as far as cold reason might lead us, but into a further region suffused with the richness of the indwelling Spirit.

II.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT OF CONSCIENCE

SO far we have considered the origin and nature of conscience. We come now to a glance at the means of education and enlightenment of conscience.[15]

We may recognize at least five influences at work constantly in the education of conscience. First, hereditary instinct. How much or how little this may be we cannot tell, but it is a factor. Darwin in his fourth chapter of the "Descent of Man," refers to traces of conscience—germinal conscience—among animals. A good hunting dog, formerly always ready for the chase, now has a litter of little ones. She sees her master getting ready for the chase. She looks at him, hesitates for a moment, the maternal instincts get the better and she slinks away to her little ones. Upon the return of her master she meets him with all signs of shame and contrition for having forsaken him. This is conscience in the primitive

form. (Cited by Paulsen, p. 341.) If there is such in animals, surely in the natural man at the start there is the hereditary instinct of knowledge of good and evil, right and wrong, in their general aspects.

A second educator in conscience is the work of parents and teachers who impress the primary facts of right and wrong continually upon the souls of the children. (See Paulsen, pp. 363-364.) We are trained into principles of right conduct even before we understand the reasons. We are taught by example and by precept. A third educator of conscience is the influence of the whole body of the people. What people think, what is the custom, what everybody regards as the right thing, has its effect on our thoughts and ideals and moral judgments. There is a general sense of right and wrong in the community, a common conscience, that must be considered, for it is more or less influential in every life. Praise or blame, honor or disgrace are its judgments.

A fourth educator of conscience is the influence of the law and the courts of justice. This

is a harsh and rigorous educator, but powerful. It deters the offender by threats and punishments. It manifests the will of the community and its abhorence of evil and criminal things. A fifth, and final, educator of conscience are the divine sanctions and commandments which surround social custom and law with religious awe. It was so in ancient religions—it is so in Christianity. This is often the most influential of all. For it looks not merely to this life, but to the life to come. It reminds us of the final tribunal, the great day of judgment. Religion also gives us a body of revelation with its external code for the supreme standard of the moral judgment—its long line of illustrious examples—and its revelation also to the inner spirit of the very will of God.[16]

These five general and special influences then—heredity, parents, people, law, religion—are responsible for the education of conscience in the general community, the nation, the world, and also for those splendid cases, now and then, of specialized conscience that are the moral high-water marks of the race.

Conscience becomes specialized in splendid individualities, who in turn become the great educators of humanity in conscience. They are those who not merely accept and follow the social conscience of the community, but rise higher. They see more deeply, they feel more strongly. They see the imperfections in the social conscience, and assert a better conscience. They are the moral leaders of the race who gradually bring the general conscience up to a higher level and everywhere inspire more individuals with nobler ideals.

Confucius and Buddha, Socrates, Plato, Marcus Aurelius and Seneca, St. Peter and St. Paul, Augustine and, later, St. Francis of Assisi and Savonarola and Cromwell, Luther and Wesley, are among the great heroes of conscience in the human succession.[17] They are men whose moral instincts stand up above the masses like mountains above the plain. But above them all, supreme forever, by the clearness of his vision, the unerringness of his wisdom, the abounding sympathy of his love, and the eternal revelation of his life and teachings, stands the Teacher of Teach-

ers, the Seer of Seers, the very Power and the Wisdom of God.

The matchless Sermon on the Mount has more in it than beautiful precepts. It is an awful searcher of the human heart. It takes the formal morality of the Ten Commandments and intensifies it a thousand fold. It seeks the thoughts and intents of the heart. Under its searchlight hate becomes murder and even a look of evil is a deed of guilt. How keen becomes conscience in such a study of the life. This gives outward objective morality a finer rule and precept. And how much greater become the subjective type, the full efflorescence of conscience in the soul after Jesus has strongly touched it unto finer issues. What an education to conscience, what a quickening, to live daily in His fellowship by prayer and meditation and loving service. This opens a new world to conscience—tender, full of sympathy and pity, strong in new vision and new power. The supreme standard and the supreme inspiration of conscience is in "that Life which is the light of men."[18]

III.

THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE.

OUR inquiries have thus led us into a study of the origin and nature of conscience. We have also considered something of the means of education and enlightenment of conscience. The final part of our discussion is to determine, as nearly as we can, the basis of the supremacy of conscience, and the measure of its authority.

We may say for one thing that the supremacy and authority of conscience lies in the hereditary experience of the race. This is much. It has actual validity in this. It finds here the logical expression of what is wholesome, and, on the other hand, what is harmful. It is the reflex of the natural order of moral life—it is the best light that humanity has gained by long and costly experience. And by such it has authority.

The conscience of the community originated first with individuals, as was indicated. Then

these, coming together in social relations, developed a social conscience. It was loyalty to their instincts for self-preservation, loyalty to each other, loyalty to the best and highest in them. The social conscience to-day is in one sense what the community believes to be best for its welfare, what is right to be done for the best good of all concerned. Its usages and conventions are the gradual outgrowths of the generations and centuries. It is an unwritten code of honor, of purity, of justice, of truth, of brotherhood. It is a consensus, a traditional heritage successively developed. Far from perfect, it is full of exceptions, and continually violated. Yet the ideal, the noblest conception, has authority in human hearts.

But we may further say, for another thing, and supremely, that conscience has its authority by the transcendent sanction of the divine—recognizable, unmistakable. The morality and holiness among men which they evolved from their innermost being must be considered for all of us who believe in God, not as merely self-derived, but as a derivation from the essence of God.

"How could those things enter into the heart of man, were they not rooted in the very nature of being? Is man an anomaly in the universe? Is he merely an accidental or external object in it? Are not he himself and his entire essence and being grounded in God?" (Paulsen, p. 366.) His best and highest are therefore surely God-derived. As Hippocrates said in the ancient days: "All things are divine, and all things are also human."

This divine sanction and authority is recognized whether we take conscience as the final clarified reason acting in moral relations or in the more mystic and vital view of conscience as a progressive consciousness of God.

But the later and fuller view seems to give a more vivid reality to divine authority in conscience. Just as an individual conscience may be a man's progressive awakening, a man's growing consciousness of the will of God, so we may define public conscience as the awakening of a community to a consciousness of the divine will. Of course we might define it in lesser ways. The public conscience is the private conscience at

work on public affairs. The public conscience is the collective sum of the individual consciences in the community. The public conscience is the average of the private conscience. But the truest and fullest definition of all would be: public conscience is the awakening of a community to a consciousness of the divine will. And when it realizes this—that it stands in the presence of God—then there is supreme authority for conscience.[19]

This conception also gives to conscience a more absolute supremacy than it could ever have before. Then it was an inexplainable faculty often "fulminating in impotent majesty" above the warring impulses in man's nature. Now, as it rises higher, it is recognized as God's presence. With conscience we are in the awful judgment hall of the Almighty.[20]

There are three prevalent distempers in the world to-day—moral nihilism, moral insanity and moral disintegration—each a defect or a perversion of conscience. Moral insanity is woefully prevalent. There are various degrees of this moral degeneration. Some are merely hard-

hearted, unscrupulous and dishonest. Some are merely devoid of conscience and remorse. Some are abnormal in their impulses. The baser and poorer sort fill our workhouses, insane asylums and jails. Always a lack of conscience means finally utter degeneration and destruction. This evil thus helps to correct itself.

But the more difficult is moral nihilism. When a man deliberately says, "Evil, be thou my good," he signs a contract with darkness and death. A famous Russian had as his motto, "I believe nothing, I fear nothing, I love nothing." That was equally a contract with bitterness, loneliness, cynicism and death. These are sinning against the light; they are stultifying conscience. They are scorning the authority of conscience to their own destruction.

Moral disintegration is the wilful division of morality into public and private codes. The morality of the present day has been largely and woefully vitiated by corporate irresponsibility. Corporations have no souls. As soon as men can shirk responsibility by a corporation, they do things that as individuals they would not think of

doing.[21] "The voice of conscience," as one has recently said, "is often keen, clear and imperative in certain regions of our lives and conduct; and muffled, confused and all but silent in certain other realms. We have had appalling revelations in recent years in commercial and political iniquity and civic unrighteousness. Often good men were involved. What is the matter? Is it not because they have a hopeless cleavage, a bridgeless gulf between their private morality and their business methods? Bureaus may investigate, Congress and legislatures pass laws, courts interpret and enforce them, but it is useless. What we need is the coördination of our ethical instincts, the bringing up of our standards in all the various regions of our life and conduct to the same high level of the moral ideal: in other words, we need the unification and integration of what in so many lives in our whole community is now a divided and disintegrated conscience." Have we enough strength and manhood in us to be able to bridge the gulf and to reinstate conscience in its integrity in the whole life of the people—individual, corporate, com-

mercial? Have we inherent force and vitality enough to meet the demands of the age?

We must recognize the fact that science and our colleges have a real and practical function in preserving and developing conscience. As Prof. Henry Sidgwick says, "Though the imperfection that we find in all the actual conditions of human existence is ultimately found even in morality itself, still practically we are to be much less concerned with correcting and improving than we are with realizing and enforcing it. . . . We must repudiate the temper of rebellion against established morality.. . . . We must contemplate it with reverence and wonder, as a marvelous product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth. . . . No politicians or philosophers could create it. Without it the harder and coarser machinery of positive law could not be permanently maintained, and the life of man would become, as Hobbes forcibly expresses it, 'solitary, poor, brutish and short.'" (Quoted by Paulsen, p. 368.)

But finally and supremely, it is the work of religion and the churches to assert the authority

of conscience in all life and to arouse society in all its phases and relations to a quickened consciousness of God. What is demanded to-day, as in all time, as its imperial right by conscience, is obedience—instant, unquestioning obedience. Argument is useless and worthless when conscience is concerned. The instinct, the intuition is truer than our reasoning. We must obey what we feel and know is right. Mistakes may be made, but nevertheless we cannot afford to disobey the dictates of conscience.

We do not obey the laws of God merely because they are the arbitrary laws of a sovereign, but because they are right. And they are right not merely because they are God's laws, but because God is right. He is the source of right. Right is good, ultimately good, and good is God. Right is not sovereign above God, but is His very nature. Right means for us—that which is really best for our welfare and fullest self-realization. We are discovering gradually what these laws are—physical and spiritual. They are God's laws—they are right—they are His inherent life and law in us. So as we obey the right, we obey

God. It is the same with conscience. Conscience is our highest light on the right. It is in its deepest reaches, the revelation of the divine will, the revealing presence of God Himself. When we obey conscience we follow our highest light. We obey God.

We need to-day not so much a revival of conscience, but a reassertion of conscience, a loyalty to the authority of conscience, a revival of conscientiousness—of immediate and absolute obedience to conscience. I hold, with Milton, for the "companionship with the sturdy champion, conscience."

The assertion of the individual conscience and independence in following this conscience, is the supreme need. We must pay no attention to the multitude and its standards, but follow our own conscience as God gives us to see the light. The earnest, fearless fight for conscience and God will mean opposition. It will often mean suffering. It will sometimes mean crucifixion and death. But it is a fight for God, and in the end it will mean victory. This is the purport of the Christian ethics of conscience.

The supreme vision of conscience comes to us in the divine drama of Galilee and the awful tragedy in Golgotha. This is the final type of the dramatic climaxes of the world's history. "The real heroes of mankind fight the battle of conscience. They rebel against conventional values, against the ideals that have become useless and false, against sham and falsehood, against the salt that has lost its savor. They preach new truths, point out new aims and new ideals, and instil new life into the soul and raise it to a higher plane." (See Paulsen, p. 370.) The Master of us all fought such a fight, and He is forever the Captain of all those who are thirsting after and battling for the kingdom of God—for truth and justice, strength and spirituality, love and freedom!

"God give us men; for times like these demand
Strong minds, great hearts, true faith and ready hand.
Men whom the lust of office does not kill;
Men whom the spoils of office cannot buy;
Men who possess opinions and a will;
Men who have honor, men who will not lie;
Men who can stand before a demagogue,
And down his treacherous flatteries and wiles;
Tall men, sun-crowned, who live above the clouds

In public duty and in private life,
For while the rabble, with their thumb-worn creeds,
Their large professions and their little deeds,
Mingle in selfish strife, lo! freedom weeps.
Wrong rules the land, and waiting justice sleeps."
God give us men! This is the crying need,
Men of strong conscience, men of valiant deed.
Men who see God, and dare to do the right!
God give us men! Then comes the new day's light!

NOTES.

NOTES.

Note 1, page 1.

Coleridge, "The Friend," Miscellany the First, Essay IV.

Note 2, page 3.

Mark Hopkins, "The Law of Love and the Love of Law."

Note 3, page 4.

Bishop Butler, Diss. II.

Note 4, page 5.

This subject of conscience is vital, fundamental and practical. It is touching the springs of all life. It is getting to the motives of action and the base of being. It is feeling the nerve not only of individual life and personal responsibility, but also has its real touch upon every phase of human life and its larger vision into the unfolding future.

We see at once strange and difficult cases of conscience presenting themselves to us in the ordinary problems of every-day life. It is undoubtedly wrong to steal a neighbor's property, but what is that man doing who lends him money when he is in trouble and then by a skilful operation gets hold of the property in a lawful way. Or what if a banker or broker is in possession of a bit of news that others have not yet heard and so manipulates the market for his own benefit? He gains a million, others lose. Where is conscience in this? Is conscience to be eliminated

when we say: Business is business. Or what if one is a director in a steamboat company and by criminal negligence of the directors, a boat is mismanaged and burned and a thousand lives lost? Is one twinge of conscience sufficient to retrieve the damage and relieve the distressed and bereaved? What if a railroad company grants a secret rebate to one large shipper over its lines to the manifest disadvantage or utter annihilation of other rival shippers, can public conscience and the law take no cognizance of it? What if great corporations manipulate legislation for their own benefit by the use of great sums of money? And if they use their stockholders' money in improper and wasteful ways? Is there no conscience or law against these things? What if an official or agent of an immense company, in violation of the rules of his corporation, shows partiality to an insurer and receives compensation for his act. That is theft. What if he does the same thing to please a friend and receives no compensation? Is conscience satisfied?

What if a young man promises a young woman that he will marry her. Afterwards he sees that he was not himself at the time and that if he does marry her it will mean misery for both of them. Must he keep his word? What does conscience say? Take many an honest woman. She buys where she can get her goods cheapest. She literally loves a bargain counter. She does not think of the pitiable conditions under which these goods must be produced to make them so cheap. Has conscience no part here? Take a politician who differs from his party on some big question. Must he leave his party or stifle his conscience or fight it out in his party, standing alone? Or an ecclesiastic or re-

ligious leader. He may differ from his church on some important question. Must he leave his church, or keep silence? What course does conscience dictate? What does honest conscience require? Or take a soldier. The first duty of a soldier is obedience, unconditional obedience, in the service. The slightest infringement is severely punished. The existence and worth of military life depends upon absolute and instant obedience. And yet there come times of emergency when soldiers have disobeyed orders and been guiltless. Officers have disobeyed their superiors and yet in the end been commended. There are exceptions to all rules. Shall conscience decide? Obedience is the rule and must be maintained. A mistaken disobedience will be severely handled. What shall be the test? Is a lie ever justifiable—for instance, in war or with the sick? It is a matter of common occurrence. Is wrong ever permissible that good may come?

These are questions of conscience. Professor Paulsen discusses many of these in his "Ethics," as do others. They are every-day, vital, important questions.

We may notice that some men are conscientious in spots. Perhaps we all are. A gentleman, for instance, finds a purse in the street. A card within gives him the address of the owner. Instantly he sets about to return that purse to the owner. His conscience forbids him to keep it. But now, notice. That gentleman when he finds the purse is on his way to the stock exchange, where, by an adroit handling of matters, by a bluff and a trick, he deprives a fellow-speculator of his entire fortune, without the slightest feeling of compunction.

There are some individuals—few, I would hope—whose consciences are so elastic or deficient that they

come to believe that everything is right that can be done without danger of falling into the hands of the police.

There may be even some who assert that conscience is nothing but a clever invention of unscrupulous priests to enslave the souls of men.

Is there any one law by which all these subtle and difficult questions can be solved? Is conscience a full and sufficient judge? Is it the ultimate tribunal? Is it any man's conscience to which we appeal? Do not even consciences differ in their sensitiveness and judgments and deliverances? Can conscience by itself be trusted, or does it need some outward law and standard?

If conscience be the judge, is it the natural, intuitive, unsophisticated conscience to which we appeal, or the well trained, educated, enlightened conscience?

These are important questions.

Note 5, page 7.

For a brief, but clear, account of Plato's doctrine of the soul, see Schwegler's "History of Philosophy," p. 114; for the Platonic ethics, *ibid.*, p. 116.

Note 6, page 8.

Conscience and the problems of conscience are as old as humanity. The Old Testament, however, does not mention the word conscience. What we call conscience, it included in the comprehensive word "heart," which for the Old Testament days usually meant affection, reason and conscience combined.

Strangely enough, the Gospels never used the word conscience. They followed the Old Testament usage and spoke of the heart, but their appeals were con-

stantly to what we would call conscience. But immediately at the beginning of apostolic teaching, when the Gospel came into contact with Greek thought and the finer analyses and discriminations of Greek definition, the apostles began to use the word conscience, and it is used by them thirty-two times in the New Testament in such phrases as "a conscience void of offense," do so and so "for conscience sake." So that conscience early became the accepted New Testament word for that something within us that tells us to do thus and so, that judges for us between right and wrong, and is either our defender or our accuser.

As the church went on through the centuries and became more and more entangled in alliance with the state, and in compromise with pagan ceremonies and customs, there grew up such a condition of church affairs, especially in medieval times, that the priest and the ecclesiastical power assumed to be the conscience for all Christians. These churchly officers took their place between a man and his God, and undertook to lord it over his conscience.

The Protestant Reformation was really nothing more or less than a new assertion of the rights of conscience. In the storm of the Reformation the medieval churchly barriers between a man and his God were fiercely swept away in one great wave of righteous wrath. And man again stood out in his conscience rights, as a man before God, with individual responsibility and infinite privilege.

Note 7, page 15.

Summarized thus from Prof. T. H. Green by Rev. T. B. Kilpatrick, of Aberdeen.

Note 8, page 15.

Prof. Henry Sidgwick, in his "History of Ethics" (p. 259), very briefly and inadequately touches on these new views of Prof. T. H. Green's "Prolegomena of Ethics." There is much more of fruitfulness, however, in these transcendental ethics than Professor Sidgwick would lead us to see in his summary of the position.

Note 9, page 17.

The several quotations in this address from Dr. Friedrich Paulsen, Profesor of Philosophy in the University of Berlin, are from his "System of Ethics," translation from the second German edition, Scribner's, 1903.

Note 10, page 19.

Quoted by Wuttke, "Christian Ethics," Vol. II, p. 107, Ed. 1861.

Note 11, page 19.

Quoted by Hickok, "Moral Science," p. 29.

Note 12, page 25.

Wuttke's "Christian Ethics," Vol. II, p. 99ff, Ed. 1861.

Note 13, page 26.

Readers of the German theologians Ritschel and Harnack, or the English Principal Fairbairn, or the American Dr. Gordon, will remember that all through their writings are the phrases "the consciousness of Christ." They say, "We must come back to the consciousness of Christ for spiritual knowledge and spiritual standards." Just what they mean by the consciousness of Christ I think may be explained by what we have said of con-

science as consciousness of God. What was Christ's conscience? What was Christ's conscience but His consciousness of God—His knowledge of God's will, His sensitive and instant appreciation of God's wishes.

Note 14, page 26.

James' "Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 231.

Note 15, page 28.

"There is a tremendously uneducated or miseducated conscience in this country to-day," said Dr. Washington Gladden in a recent address. "People in good society, people who are members of our churches, people who are known as our leading citizens, are doing things which are horribly wrong, and neither do their own conscience seem to protest, nor is there any moral sense in the community which adequately disapproves their wrong-doing. The things which have been going on of late can only be explained upon the theory of a general lapse in conscience, in financial circles and in political circles, in society and, most deplorable of all, in the church itself. The one thing this country needs most to-day is not better laws, nor better methods of administration, but a clearing up and toning up of the conscience of its citizens."

Note 16, page 30.

One or two problems of conscience may show how this new thought explains them. We are puzzled at times by the divergence in the deliverances of conscience in different individuals, or in different eras, or between different nations or religions. The Hindoo

mother, for instance, obeying as she thinks her conscience, throws her child into the Ganges. We, with our conscience, revolt at such a thing. The ancient Jews, in their warfare, were cruel and vindictive seemingly with all good conscience. Our conscience recoils at such deeds. What is the explanation? Is it not found in this conception of conscience as progressive consciousness of God? The conscience of the early races was only partially awakened. They had a glimpse of God in conscience, resulting in worship, and devotion, and in willing and oftentimes sublime sacrifice, but not enough to direct all their acts of service or sacrifice aright. A growing conscience corrects these earlier mistakes of the race.

There must also come into this explanation the fact of deterioration of conscience by individuals or nations through disobedience. How much clear and growing conscience could be expected in the ancient Jews who were so persistently disobedient, in the midst of their spasmodic obedience.

What of the case of St. Paul before and after conversion, to take another instance? Before his conversion he was persecuting the Christians and thinking that he was doing God's service. His conscience approved. His conversion was a new discovery of God through the vision of Christ, on the Damascus road. The new and enlarged consciousness absolutely changed and quickened his conscience to the truth and right.

Take still another phase. We are also puzzled at times by the seeming conflict of duties that conscience occasionally provokes. Analyze these cases of conscience, and it will be seen that conscience does not give conflicting deliverances, but it is really conscience

and instinct, or conscience and desire that are in conflict.

Sir Walter Scott has given a historic instance in the story of Jeanie Deans in "The Heart of Midlothian." Shall she tell a falsehood in order to save her sister's life? It is a conflict between truth and affection. She obeys what she believes is conscience and goes forth in loving and noblest sacrifice. The solution for us in all such cases is to obey what we feel is nearest God.

Note 17, page 31.

The great drama of "Faust," into which Goethe put his life, is in a sense a study of conscience, (as Paulsen notes, "Ethics," p. 372). Faust, in the first part of the drama shows how, having exhausted learning and tiring of study, the philosopher gradually emancipates himself from the customs and beliefs of the people, stultifies conscience, and gives himself up to pleasure and the devil. He destroys the peace of a family, sacrifices the happiness of an innocent and lovable girl; through him Gretchen murders her mother, her brother and her child. He forsakes her and joins the cavalcade that moves upon the witch-drama of the Blockberg, the false and polite delusions of life. The loss of conscience means the loss of all things, and deeper and deeper he goes into the mire. In the second part of the drama, not often read, Goethe vainly endeavors to show how Faust is redeemed by a renewal of conscience through subjecting himself again to measure and law. But we tire of the curious hydraulic enterprises of the old man. It may be service, but there is not enough suffering and struggle in it. His conscience has not shown the depth of remorse that we believe the real tragedy of sin in his life demands.

Note 18, page 32.

"They only the victory win
Who have fought the good fight and have vanquished
the demon that tempts us within;
Who have held to their faith unseduced by the prize
that the world holds on high;
Who have dared for a high cause to suffer, resist, fight—
if needs be, to die.
Speak, history, who are life's victors? Unroll thy long
annals, and say—
Are they those whom the world called the victors, who
won the success of a day?
The martyrs or Nero? The Spartans who fell at
Thermopylæ's tryst,
Or the Persians and Xerxes? His judges, or Socrates?
Pilate, or Christ?"

W. W. Story in "Io Victis."

Note 19, page 36.

With this larger conception of conscience before us, we may examine some of the New Testament references concerning conscience, and see their full and practical application. The New Testament is very explicit and emphatic in applying conscience to all the duties of life. Every phase of life is brought within its sweep and is made absolutely subject to its majestic arbitrament. The first mention of conscience in the New Testament is in John's Gospel in the incident of the woman taken in sin. Her accusers, as the Gospel reads, "being convicted by their own conscience, went out one by one." The second mention is in St. Paul's letter to the Romans (2:15), when he speaks of the Gentiles, "not having

the Mosaic law, yet having a law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or excusing one another." Still, again, in the letters to the Corinthians (10:25), St. Paul says: "Whatsoever is set before you, eat, asking no questions for conscience sake, . . . for why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience." Again, in the Acts (24:16), St. Paul says: "I exercise myself to have always a conscience void of offense toward God and man." And, again, he says (2 Cor. 4:1, 2): "By manifestation of the truth we commend ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God." These and many other similar instances in Gospels and epistles show the usage of the New Testament.

Note 20, page 36.

I sat alone with my conscience
  In a place where time had ceased
And we talked of my former living
  In the land where the years increased;
And I felt I should have to answer
  The question it put to me,
And to face the answer and question
  Throughout all eternity.

The ghosts of forgotten actions
  Came floating before my sight,
And things that I thought were dead things
  Were alive with a terrible might.
And I thought of my former living
  And the Judgment Day to be,
But sitting alone with my conscience
  Seemed judgment enough for me.

Then I woke from my timely dreaming,
And the vision passed away,
And I knew the far-away warning
Was a warning of yesterday.
Then I felt that the future was present,
And the present would never go by,
For it was but the thought of my past life
Grown into eternity.

So I sit alone with my conscience,
In the place where the years increase,
And I try to remember the future
In the land where time shall cease.
And I know of the future judgment
Whatever it all may be,
Yet to sit alone with my conscience
Will be judgment enough for me.

Note 21, page 38.

The individual responsibility for corporate action must also be emphasized. "Corporations," as a recent ethical writer puts it, "have almost unlimited power to inflict injustice and suffering, and wherever there is injustice and suffering, somebody is to blame for it. Ordinarily the stockholders will shelter themselves behind the corporation; but what is everybody's business is nobody's business, and the injustice goes on. If a corporation has no conscience, every officer of the corporation has, and it is his business to see to it that nothing is done that his individual conscience could not sanction. The officers are directly responsible for the management of

the affairs. If these are conducted in such a way that an officer's conscience cannot approve of them, then let him protest, and if that does not do any good, then let him get out of it and stay not upon the order of his going." Not only must we emphasize individual responsibility for corporate action, but also we must assert one standard for both corporate and private morality.

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